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The paper is a discussion of Charles Taylor’s recent book The Language 
Animal. The criticism of Taylor’s view of language clusters around two 
main themes: fi rst, that he seems to “mysterianize” language somewhat, 
whereas the topics he addresses can be adequately dealt with within 
standard formal approaches in the philosophy of language and cognitive 
science; second, that his focus on language is in many cases misplaced, 
and should indeed be replaced with a focus on human conceptual struc-
ture, which language only fragmentarily expresses.
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Charles Taylor’s most recent book1 contains, towards the end, this 
sentence which indicates its scope and ambition: “With phrases like 
‘animal possessing language’, we are trying to answer a question like: 
‘what is human nature?’” (338–9). This aligns very closely with the 
leading thought of a book published also in 2016 by another crucial 
contemporary thinker, Noam Chomsky, who states: “there are much 
more fundamental reasons to try to determine clearly what language 
is, reasons that bear directly on the question of what kind of creatures 
we are” (2016: 2). But, if their goals in inspecting language are close-
ly related, the respective takes on language by Chomsky and Taylor 
couldn’t be more different. Whereas Chomsky is one of the founders 
of contemporary formal approaches to language, Taylor is concerned 
1 See references for bibliographical data.
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throughout his book with stressing the affective, enactive, “embodied” 
aspects of language not captured by the formal theories; and whereas 
Chomsky is the arch-internalist and individualist of our time, Taylor 
insists on seeing language in the context of sharing (“the linguistic ca-
pacity is essentially shared” 333) and “communion” (situations of joint 
attention).
So, what is Taylor’s exact take on language in the book that is the 
focus of this discussion? He states: “language can only be understood 
if we understand its constitutive role in human life” (261). Language 
brings to human life new goals and purposes that wouldn’t exist with-
out it, it alters our way of being in the world (echoes of Heidegger are 
non-accidental)—language is not just part of the framework of general 
human activities, but transforms the whole framework. Language is 
crucially constitutive, claims Taylor drawing on the work of Herder, in 
opposition to being purely designative of antecedently given entities, a 
position he identifi es in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Condillac (what 
he calls the HLC theory), and continued in “post-Fregean analytic phi-
losophy of language”.
Crucial aspects of the linguistic capacity which demonstrate this 
constitutivity for Taylor are three: what he calls human or metabio-
logical meanings; the effi cacy of discourse; the sense-making power of 
narrative. So, let me explicate them briefl y.
As examples of human meanings, Taylor lists virtue and motiva-
tional terms (generosity, loyalty, love/lust), terms for stances and ways 
in which we experience life (serene, troubled) and aesthetic terms. 
These meanings, as opposed to mere “biological meanings” (like “food”, 
for instance), cannot be understood from the outside and dispassionate-
ly; instead, they are felt, they cannot exist without affect, and require 
Einfühlung (empathizing, putting oneself in the other’s shoes) to be un-
derstood. Further, these meanings, claims Taylor, are interconnected, 
forming “skeins”, and are deeply interwoven with culture (think of the 
notion of loyalty for a samurai and a member of contemporary individu-
alistic society).
Crucially for Taylor, human meanings open up new domains, new 
ways of experiencing. They are not just names for antecedently existing 
and language-independently observable things. Rather, the expression 
used for the meaning is essential to the experience it names, not pre-
ceded by it. These meanings are in such a way constitutive of specifi -
cally human ways of being. Further, although they are dependent on 
us, we can, claims Taylor, get things wrong when operating with these 
meanings—both descriptively (wrongly describing somebody as loyal) 
and normatively (wrongly attacking somebody for lack of loyalty). And 
we can correct ourselves, through “transitions” (development of better 
understanding) ratifi ed by intuition.
These meanings crucially involve enactment, claims Taylor—for in-
stance, the display of loyalty involves types of bodily movement and 
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bearing. They can also emerge through works of art. These works, in 
case of literary works of art, contain no assertions about life and hu-
man meanings, but can portray them. In fact, Taylor identifi es three 
levels of articulation of meanings (three “rungs in a ladder”, as he puts 
it): enactive; symbolic (which concerns the portrayals that works of art 
offer); and descriptive-analytic.
Human meanings are, according to Taylor, understood hermeneuti-
cally: in circles, without a fi nal and objective defi nition.
The second aspect of constitutivity of language that Taylor discuss-
es is the effi cacy of discourse. Norms, footings, institutions and social 
orders are constituted and transformed in discourse, claims Taylor. By 
“footings” he understands the mutual positions of interlocutors in so-
cial-discursive space. These are affi rmed in discourse (talking politely 
to one’s superior), but can be challenged and transformed (“go to hell, 
boss”). Whole social orders are carried and shaped in discourse.
The third aspect is narrative. Narrative, says Taylor, offers insight 
through diachronic gestalts, units of character, event, motivation, etc., 
where the issues involved concern human meanings. Taylor claims that 
narrative is crucial to self-understanding (a claim well known from a 
strand of contemporary research into the constitution of personality). 
The telling of stories is therefore a creative/constitutive feature of lan-
guage.
Before discussing these crucial aspects, Taylor discusses fi guring, 
or the creative use of language. In “fi guring A through B”, mainly in 
metaphor, we gain new powers of articulation, with bodily know-how 
underlying this (here Taylor draws heavily on the work of the cognitive 
linguist George Lakoff and collaborator Mark Johnson who stress the 
creative role of metaphor and the bodily basis of metaphorical mean-
ings). This is something that the HLC paradigm, according to Taylor, 
completely misses. Taylor concedes that Frege made some crucial ad-
justments to this paradigm: by introducing the context principle, he 
freed it of atomism; by construing sense as abstract and public, he 
cured it of individualism. However, this paradigm is, in Taylor’s view, 
still limited by recognizing only designative (as opposed to constitu-
tive) logic, which it attributes to language: it sees language as objective 
depictive power, and nothing above this. Taylor challenges this view 
throughout the book, as indicated above.
But before discussing language as constitutive, Taylor attributes to 
it other important characteristics. First of all, crucial to operating with 
language is an irreducible sensitivity to rightness (echoes of later Witt-
genstein are obvious). Words have right and wrong uses, and an aware-
ness of this is ineliminable as an aspect of the language capacity. Fur-
ther, language is impossible unless holistically conceived—one word 
presupposes all others, does not function in isolation (Fodor would have 
a lot to say about this, but that will not be the focus of this discussion). 
Finally, language is part of a range of symbolic forms, which all have to 
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be taken into account if language is to be appreciated in its full scope.
Language (along with the self) develops, claims Taylor, following 
the work of Michael Tomasello, in the context of emotion-infused joint 
attention, which Taylor calls “communion”. Of course, the ineliminable 
emotional chargedness of situations enables us to acquire the human 
meanings which are, as we have seen, “felt”.
Language alters, Taylor claims, our way of being in the world, it 
opens up for us new dimensions of existence, which wouldn’t be pos-
sible without it.
Criticism of Taylor’s view of language will cluster around two main 
themes: fi rst, that he seems to “mysterianize” language somewhat, 
whereas the topics he addresses can be adequately dealt with within 
standard formal approaches in the philosophy of language and cogni-
tive science; second, that his focus on language is in many cases mis-
placed, and should indeed be replaced with a focus on human concep-
tual structure, which language only fragmentarily expresses.
Let me return to Taylor’s “human meanings”. First of all, Taylor 
seems to claim that many forms of thought would be utterly impos-
sible without language—e.g. thought about loyalty. However, empiri-
cal research has shown this to be false. Steven Pinker’s (1994), which 
Taylor cites, provides abundant evidence of this (cf. ch. 3). There are 
fully intelligent aphasics, capable of complex mental operations, such 
as playing card games or recounting pantomimed narratives. There 
are also languageless beings, such as prelinguistic infants or monkeys, 
who are able to reason about space, time, objects, number, causality 
and, interestingly with regard to the example of loyalty, obligations (in 
vervet monkeys) to members of family, such as avenging a member. 
Finally, many creative people report that their crucial insights didn’t 
come through language, but through mental imagery.
On the other hand, if we take into account what kind of terms Tay-
lor gives as examples of his human meanings, we see that these are 
simply value-laden terms, or thick concepts, in Bernard Williams’s 
usage. And these, mostly in the guise of pejoratives or slurs, are ac-
tually a hot topic in contemporary philosophy of language. The most 
recent book-length contribution to the debate is Nenad Miščević’s and 
Julija Perhat’s (2016). This book offers a detailed, layered account of 
the meaning of such terms. For any pejorative (or laudative) it factors 
out its meaning into the following layers: minimal descriptive, descrip-
tive-evaluative (e.g. “primitive, lazy, dangerous”), prescriptive (e.g. “to 
be avoided, discriminated against”) and expressive (e.g. “yuck”). This 
account then offers a basis for claiming that using a pejorative or a 
laudative gives rise to several propositions being expressed by a sen-
tence in which it is used. Now, this kind of account lends itself to re-
alization in computational terms, and seems to take away a lot of the 
“aura” that Taylor builds around his human meanings—it places those 
meanings squarely within something that can be dealt with by a formal 
account of language. For example, the term “loyalty” could be cashed 
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out as having descriptive (the set of loyal acts), descriptive-evaluative 
(“proneneness to help those one is obliged to”), prescriptive (“be such!”) 
and expressive (“commendable!”) layers.
As for the notion of human value itself, Ray Jackendoff, in his 
(2007), offers a whole theory of the human value system in computa-
tional terms. Jackendoff posits that the value system is a multidimen-
sional calculating system, a part of the cognitive system which helps 
govern action. By multidimensional he means that different kinds of 
value can be distinguished, each with a valence and a magnitude, and 
with subjective and objective versions. The types of value Jackendoff 
identifi es are affective value, utility, resource value, quality, prowess, 
normative value, personal normative value, and esteem. Important re-
lations obtain between these kinds of value: e.g. the greater the affec-
tive value or utility of one’s act for another, the greater the normative 
value of the act (positive or negative). Whereas this system is in all 
likelihood innately based, proposes Jackendoff, a major component of 
learning a culture is learning the rules that assign values to particu-
lar sorts of action. This, or something like it, is, I propose, the system 
that could be said to underlie Taylor’s human meanings. And this is, I 
submit, the kind of theory we should strive for when it comes to human 
values. It is easy to see how loyalty would fi t nicely into it. 
Taylor claims that in the case of human meanings, the experience 
does not preceed the expression. However, how would this be cashed 
out? One of his examples is the attitude of “cool” as adopted by young 
people. The idea is that it isn’t the case that, fi rst, there was a fully 
shaped attitude, mode of behavior, which was then just christened as 
being “cool”; rather, the expression “cool” helped the attitude emerge, 
take shape. But it seems that a more illuminating account of this pro-
cess is this: there was an incipient conceptualization (emotionally co-
loured) of what it is to be cool, which additionally crystallized when 
the term “cool” was coined (rather, transferred metaphorically from 
the temperature domain). The notion of an incipient conceptualization 
seems to be able to bring down to earth, so to speak, the rather mysteri-
ous notion of the expression “opening up new domains” and not being 
preceded by what it designates.
The theme of stressing conceptualization rather than language is 
the second one I would like to develop here in opposition to Taylor. Tay-
lor talks of the effi cacy of discourse in constituting social reality. This 
is of course reminiscent of Searle’s (1995). But that book also seems 
to talk of language where talk of conceptualization would be more ad-
equate. An institutional fact can be created by language, but also by 
raising a fl ag or touching one’s shoulders with a sword, or putting a 
crown on one’s head. It is the conceptualization of a physical action 
counting as the creation of a new institutional reality that is crucial; 
this conceptualization can be prompted/anchored by a linguistic act, 
but also by other symbolic acts.
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We can continue the theme of conceptualization as being dominant 
to language in discussing Taylor’s account of narrative. He sees the 
constitutivity of language embodied, amongst other things mentioned 
above, in the sense-making work of narrative. However, recent work 
on understanding narrative (cf. Turner 1996, Dancygier 2012) draws 
on cognitive linguistics (the wokk of Lakoff and Johnson and others), 
which operates under the premiss that language doesn’t encode mean-
ing directly, but is a system of prompts for the construction of meaning 
(cf. Fauconnier and Turner 2002). As Dancygier elaborates, the story 
that we reconstruct from a text, the emergent story, is the result of a 
process of blending of mental spaces (technical terms in cognitive lin-
guistics). Mental spaces are conceptual packages we construct on-line 
during thinking and speaking. The crucial thing here is that language 
only prompts us to this, but does not contain explicit instructions on 
how to do it, so that the resulting construction is much richer than the 
language used to spawn it. To give an example, dealing with complex 
constellations having to do with (multiple or shifting) points of view 
in a story requires building and manipulating a multiplicity of such 
mental spaces. The moral: language is only the tip of the iceberg, and 
conceptual structure is what’s doing the real work here. And not only is 
language as a rule only the tip of the iceberg, but it is not even neces-
sary to activate the said cognitive structures—this can be done rather 
well by means of pantomime or pictures, for instance.
The point of the language vs. conceptual structure discussion could 
be encapsulated thus: it is not that language “creates new ways of be-
ing” for humans; it is rather that human conceptual structure, evolved 
through natural selection (and possible other mechanisms), and ex-
pressible by language, makes us what we are, and has made us such 
since it appeared some 50 000 years ago.
A few fi nal remarks. Taylor insists that language should be viewed 
as part of a range of symbolic forms, including dance, music, litera-
ture (echoing Cassirer). However, language seems to be rather unique 
amongst these, perhaps justifying the claim of a categorical difference. 
For one thing, language is the only system which has both form and 
content, and has undisputable minimal units which combine both. 
These are morphemes, e.g. “horse” and “s” in “horses”. Dance or litera-
ture have no such undisputable units (despite valiant efforts of semioti-
cians to identify them). Second, language seems to have an innate basis 
which channels its development, one which kicks in almost right after 
birth, and delivers full-blown language by age three. If this window is 
missed due to lack of input, the language ability never develops in a 
normal capacity. Nothing of the sort holds of dance or understanding/
producing literature.
Finally, Taylor claims that language develops in the context of 
“communion”, i. e. emotion-infused joint attention. This is undoubtedly 
true, but it is very questionable whether this proves that language is 
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essentially shared. Chomsky would say that “language is essentially 
an instrument of thought. Externalization then would be an ancillary 
process” (2016: 14). It is as yet unclear, that is, to what extent being 
exposed to external input really shapes language in the child’s mind, 
or merely prompts it to grow along a genetically predetermined course.
In conclusion, Taylor’s book is an insightful, learned, ambitious, 
and coherent discussion of language, that attempts to offer an alterna-
tive to accounts dominating current formal linguistics and philosophy 
of language. I am just sceptical of the approach it argues for and of the 
limits it claims for the standard picture.
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